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THE NEW ESTABLISHMENTARIANISM
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL*
I. LIBERALISM AND ESTABLISHMENTARIANISM
The idea that political communities should share common values
has enduring attraction. Plato treated it as virtually axiomatic that
the nature of the regime must be reflected in the characteristic virtues
of the citizens -citizens of a monarchical regime should have souls
appropriate to a monarchical regime, citizens of an aristocratic regime
should have souls appropriate to an aristocratic regime, and so forth.
Rousseau argued that true freedom could exist only in a society
where the hearts and minds of the citizens were in perfect accord with
the general will. This sense of common feeling-of fraternity-in
Rousseau is so profound that subordinate associations that create
divided loyalties must be suppressed. Others, while stopping short of
espousing that thick of a conception of fraternity, worry that
"balkanization" and excessive attachment to subordinate associations
threaten the unity and harmony of the society. Historian Arthur
Schlesinger, for example, has warned that in America, the land of "e
pluribus unum," we have lost the balance between unum and
pluribus.1
The idea that a nation should be animated by a set of common
values and beliefs, backed by governmental authority, may be called
establishmentarianism. Ordinarily, establishmentarianism is asso-
ciated with an expressly religious orthodoxy, but that is not essential.
Orthodoxies come in secular as well as religious varieties.
Establishmentarianism is also commonly associated with persecution,
but that too is a misconception; establishments can range from highly
coercive (compelling affirmation of belief and persecuting dissenters)
to tolerant. In a tolerant establishment, dissenters are not compelled
to espouse the orthodoxy and are not punished for their dissent, but
the financial, cultural, and symbolic resources of the nation are
* Presidential Professor, University of Utah College of Law.
1. See ARTHUR M SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA 141 (W. W. Norton
& Co. rev. ed. 1998) (1991).
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deployed in support of collective beliefs about the good. Tolerant or
coercive, establishments must determine what beliefs to favor, and
use governmental authority of some sort to foster those beliefs.
Liberalism 2 seems to be a break from establishmentarianism. In
the liberal tradition, it is thought that citizens of a political community
need not share common values regarding the nature of the good life.
It is possible, liberals have taught, for people of widely divergent
values and commitments to live together in harmony, so long as they
mutually forswear the use of public power or private violence to
induce their fellow citizens to conform. All must agree to live and let
live. We need not agree on much more than that. A liberal society is
not a polis.
Liberalism presupposes that there are many reasonable, but
mutually inconsistent, worldviews that are compatible with good
citizenship,3 and it is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt to
forge agreement.4 Some citizens take their cues from tradition and
normative authorities such as sacred texts and churches; some
entertain a vision of the transformation of society into something new
and better; some believe that science and reason can (in principle)
supply answers to questions of public concern; some, like the Amish,
withdraw from society and seek to live their own lives in peace.
People also disagree in the conclusions they reach. Some people are
libertarians and some are communitarians; some are religious and
some are secular; some are feminists, some are environmentalists,
some are capitalists, some are hedonists, and some are apolitical.
They may be fierce adversaries in the political struggle, but the liberal
premise is that there is no need for them all to agree. All can be good
2. Liberalism is
a... doctrine of private individual and institutional rights, a judiciary dedicated to the
enforcement of those rights, a system of representation designed to mute the excesses
of popular passions, a constitutional framework that impedes the hasty translation of
public impulses into sweeping changes of fundamental law, and, above all, a private
sphere diverse and capacious enough to mount a stem defense against public
encroachment.
WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PuRPosEs 53 (1991).
3. It is sometimes asserted that liberalism must be neutral among all conceptions of the
good, but this is implausible. Some worldviews (for example, advocacy of slavery or torture) are
inconsistent with good citizenship, and can be discouraged (even if not persecuted) by a liberal
state. But liberalism is a question of degree, and a regime is liberal to the extent that it has a
broad understanding of the worldviews that are welcomed as equal participants in civic life.
4. John Rawls explains: "Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a
plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the
exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional
democratic regime." JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM at xviii (1996).
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Some may be closer to the mainstream, and thus have greater
influence on the laws, but none has an official status that makes it
constitutionally superior to the others. The dominant values of the
society are constantly open to debate and reconsideration (except for
the constitutional fundamentals, which are confined to political and
institutional questions). To the extent that there are "common"
values in the society, these values emerge as a result of what John
Rawls calls an "overlapping consensus."'6 They are not derived or
imposed collectively.
There are at least three major arguments for the superiority of
liberalism over establishmentarianism. First is the noninstrumental
value: it allows free men and women to live their lives in accordance
with their own conscience and convictions. This is traditionally the
most important argument for liberalism. Second, liberalism enables
people of divergent beliefs on fundamental questions to live together
in relative harmony. When the state can create an official orthodoxy,
people who care about the issues will find it necessary to fight over
which creeds and virtues will be established, and dissenters become
second-class citizens, if not outright rebels. Establishments politicize
moral, cultural, and religious differences, generate discord, and create
feelings of exclusion and alienation among the losers. Third,
liberalism preserves the social preconditions of pluralistic democracy,
which requires a certain degree of heterogeneity and dissent as a
protection against complacency and error. A marketplace of ideas is
useless if there are no differences among the ideas competing for
attention. As Madison argued in Federalist No. 10, a multiplicity of
sects and factions is a structural protection against majority
oppression.
The great weakness of a liberal state is that it is dependent on
cultural and demographic preconditions over which it has no direct
control. A multiplicity of sects and factions is essential to liberal
government, but liberal government cannot bring sects and factions
into being. Liberal government can only provide guarantees of
freedom of association to protect those that exist. Moreover, a
6. According to Rawls, political liberalism represents a consensus regarding political
essentials among adherents of different and conflicting comprehensive worldviews. There is no
need for citizens to agree on the reasons that support these political arrangements. Indeed, in a
pluralistic society no one "comprehensive doctrine" can "secure the basis of social unity, nor
can it provide the content of public reason on fundamental political questions." Rather, each of
the various worldviews will endorse these political arrangements "from its own point of view."
RAWLS, supra note 4, at 134; see also id. at 147.
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citizens in their own way.
Since liberalism does not take sides in the conflicts among these
many different, but reasonable, understandings, it is unable to engage
in effective inculcation of public virtue. Any attempt to inculcate
virtue must necessarily offer reasons, and draw upon cultural
resources such as stories, songs and ceremonies. But both the reasons
and the cultural resources at hand will necessarily resemble those of
one moral tradition or community, and thus appear to be parochial or
sectarian from other points of view. Even multiculturalism represents
a particular tradition and way of life. Were it not so, multiculturalism
would not be so controversial. Accordingly, it is difficult or
impossible for a liberal state to engage in the direct inculcation of
public virtue without compromising its liberal commitment to
neutrality among the different and competing reasonable worldviews
of the society. When it tries to square this circle, the result is a thin,
least-common-denominator version of public virtue too pale to
compete effectively with the forces of pop culture and materialism
that are all around us.
The principal role for the development and inculcation of ideas
of the good life in a liberal society therefore devolves upon private
associations.5  Unlike the liberal state, with its commitment to
universalism and neutrality, these normative subcommunities,
collectively called "civil society," are free to ground their teachings in
deep and coherent - albeit particularistic or sectarian-
comprehensive worldviews, and to reinforce those teachings by
means of evocative and resonant-albeit nonuniversalistic-
traditions and cultural resources. Not surprisingly, such groups are
frequently able to engage the loyalties of their adherents more
intensely than the wider society can do. And necessarily, since these
groups will differ with one another in the content both of their moral
teaching and of the cultural resources they bring to bear, they will
tend to create divisions in society. Many of the papers in this
symposium pose the question whether these divisions are desirable,
and if not, what to do about them.
According to traditional liberal theory, the network of private
associations that make up civil society contributes to the public good
by inculcating ideas of public and private virtue, but no group's
beliefs can be "established" as the official orthodoxy of the society.
5. The essential characteristic of a private association is that it lacks coercive power and
thus has no power to prevent exit. The state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
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certain degree of public virtue is essential to republican government,7
but a liberal regime is essentially dependent on civil society to
produce a virtuous citizenry.
Most alarmingly, the liberal society risks being undermined by
groups that do not support liberal institutions. Not all private
associations will inculcate public virtue (from a liberal perspective).
In addition to worthy civic associations, like bowling leagues and the
PTA, there will be Communist cells, Ku Klux Klans, militias, gangsta
rappers, and ecoterrorists. But liberals conclude that the risk entailed
by these groups is less serious than the risks of even well-intentioned
establishmentarianism. There are certain built-in structural
tendencies that incline civil society toward the inculcation of public
virtue rather than public vice. The mere fact that these associations
are groups tends to make them antidotes to selfishness and isolation,
which are two ever-present moral risks of liberal capitalism. More
significantly, pluralism tends to induce groups to tolerate and
cooperate with others, out of self-interest and in order to gain
influence in the society. If a group wants to flourish, it needs to
appeal to a broad audience, which discourages narrow sectarianism;
and if a group needs to find allies, it must engage in compromise and
cooperation with others. The social structure in which various groups
operate thus creates incentives for social harmony, without any need
for direct intervention in their belief systems.
By contrast, direct attempts to tame or silence those we think are
injurious to public virtue tend to backfire and to turn in illiberal
directions. When, for example, we try to silence unpatriotic voices by
banning flag desecration or intolerant voices by enacting hate speech
codes, it tends to exacerbate the dissenters' feelings of alienation and
to radicalize their opposition to liberal institutions. On the whole,
even if some subgroups are not liberal, a pluralistic society seems
more likely to live harmoniously if it extends freedom of speech,
association, and religion to seemingly illiberal subgroups than if it
attempts to weed out dangerous voices. But that means that a liberal
society is always at risk. One can hope that the free institutions of
civil society will produce virtuous citizens, each in its own way, and
believe that the structure of liberal pluralism will tend in that
direction. But there is no guarantee. Liberalism is vulnerable at its
7. See TBE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("Republican government presupposes the existence of [virtue] in a higher degree than any
other form.").
2001
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foundations.
In light of this vulnerability, it is not surprising that
establishmentarianism also has its advocates. It is tempting to say
that the government should take a more direct role in the inculcation
of public virtue. Such an important matter should not be left to
chance, or to the market, or to the private sphere. Establishmenta-
rian measures are usually urged not on the perfectionist ground that
they would improve the souls of the citizens, but on the political
ground that certain common values are necessary to the unity and
republican character of the state. Benjamin Rush, for example,
argued: "I consider it as possible to convert men into republican
machines. This must be done if we expect them to perform their parts
properly in the machine of the government of the state.'" 8 He thus
advocated creation of "one general and uniform system of education"
which will "render the mass of the people more homogeneous and
thereby fit them more easily for uniform and peaceable
government."9  Similarly, Horace Mann, the father of public
education, urged the state to "secure[] to all its children, that basis of
knowledge and morality, which is indispensable to its own security."10
The difficulty with this position is that any teaching about public
virtue robust and specific enough to be useful will necessarily conflict
with other reasonable and legitimate ways of understanding public
virtue. When a liberal society decides to play a direct role in the
inculcation of public virtue, it thus faces a dilemma. Either it must
take sides in favor of one particular reasonable worldview or it must
seek a "least common denominator" among the various reasonable
worldviews. The former course will necessarily be divisive and
illiberal. The search for a least common denominator, however, if
pursued honestly, will produce little more than a thin, watered-down,
platitudinous understanding of public virtue. (This is on the empirical
assumption that pluralism in modern liberal societies is serious and
deep; if moral differences are trivial, the least common denominator
may be thick enough to be useful.) Moreover, in all likelihood,
politics being what it is, the search for common values will prove in
8. Benjamin Rush, A Plan for the Establishment of Public Schools and the Diffusion of
Knowledge in Pennsylvania, in ESSAYS ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 17 (Frederick
Rudolph ed., 1965), quoted in CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON
SCHOOL 90 (1988).
9. Rush, supra note 8, at 22, quoted in GLENN, supra note 8, at 89.
10. HORACE MANN, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (Feb. 1838), reprinted in 2 THE LIFE AND
WORKS OF HORACE MANN 418 (Boston, Walker, Fuller 1867), quoted in GLENN, supra note 8,
at 220 (emphasis added).
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practice to be little more than an excuse for imposition of
majoritarian norms.
Through most of the nineteenth century and well into the
twentieth century, for example, public educators were less squeamish
about the inculcation of common values than they are in this age of
self-conscious pluralism and diversity. Public schools explicitly
supported the common values of civil religion (originally
Protestantism and later some kind of 'Judeo-Christianity"),
capitalism and its attendant virtues of self-reliance and personal
responsibility, and patriotism, against the perceived threats to these
values from immigrant groups, Catholics and Jews (and later atheists
and "secular humanists"), and political radicals and subversives.
Today it is common to deride these hegemonic ideologies. But it is
important to recognize that the establishmentarians of this earlier era
were not merely narrow-minded bigots. They had genuine reasons
for fearing that the moral and cultural underpinnings of Americanism
were endangered by the influx of strangers to these shores. Catholics,
for example, were suspected of lacking the essential republican
virtues of thinking for oneself and valuing individual conscience.11
Indeed, Protestant activists could point to papal encyclicals
denouncing liberalism and Americanism, which confirmed their
darkest fears.12 Capitalism and the traditional family could be seen as
the very foundation of the American way of life. Socialists and other
malcontents seemed disloyal to fundamental American democratic
principles.
Thus, nativists, anti-Catholics, and common school reformers
joined in creating public institutions to inculcate Protestant, capitalist,
and patriotic virtue in the children of newly arrived immigrants. They
also created obstacles to the formation of alternative systems of
private education that might pass on foreign beliefs and anti-
American ideas to coming generations.13 Common school advocates
11. See John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the American
Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960, J. AM. HIST., June 1997, at 97, 97-98.
12. See RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE, 1800-1860: A STUDY OF
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM (1938); GLENN, supra note 8, at 219-35. For examples
of nineteenth century anti-Catholic argumentation, see LYMAN BEECHER, A PLEA FOR THE
WEST (1835); R. W. THOMPSON, THE PAPACY AND THE CIVIL POWER (1876). These
arguments continued well into the modem era, and were often endorsed by elite intellectual
figures. See PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER (1949);
McGreevy, supra note 11.
13. See LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825-1925
(1987); GLENN, supra note 8, at 219-35; WARD M. MCAFEE, RELIGION, RACE, AND
RECONSTRUCTION: THE PUBLIC SCHOOL IN THE POLITICS OF THE 1870S, at 27-78, 175-202
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were particularly incensed at the thought that public funds might be
used to subsidize education in "sectarian" schools. According to
prominent Connecticut clergyman and educational reformer Horace
Bushnell, if funds were provided to Catholic schools, their children
will be shut up in schools that do not teach them what, as
Americans, they most of all need to know, the political geography
and political history of the world, the rights of humanity, the
struggles by which those rights are vindicated, and the glorious
rewards of liberty and social advancement that follow. They will be
instructed mainly into the foreign prejudices and superstitions of
their fathers, and the state, which proposes to be clear of all
sectarian affinities in religion, will pay the bills!14
Indeed, the very existence of ethnic and religious pluralism was
often perceived as a threat to American unity. Rousseau's insistence
on fraternity found an echo in the argument made by an opponent of
parochial schools in testimony to Congress in 1889: the "task of
absorbing and Americanizing these foreign masses can only be
successfully overcome by a uniform system of American schools,
teaching the same political creed.' 1 5 This, he said, would "continue
us" as "a united, homogeneous people. ' 16 The theme of unity and
"Americanization" was dominant in discussions of education,
immigration, religion, and related issues well into this century.
The argument for common schools found its logical extension in
an Oregon law requiring all children to attend public schools. The
attorney defending this law in the Supreme Court argued:
Under all governments, even those which are the most free and
democratic in their character, the citizen must always owe duties to
the State; and it necessarily follows that the State has an interest in
making it certain (which can only be done by appropriate
legislation) that the citizen is fitted, both in mind and body, to
perform these duties. The discretionary powers of a State are
broad enough to permit it to decide that compulsory attendance at
public schools is a proper "precautionary measure against the
moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly convicts."
The voters of Oregon who adopted this law had the right to act on
the belief that the fact that the great increase in juvenile crime in
the United States followed so closely after the great increase in the
number of children in the United States who were not attending
public schools, was more than a coincidence. The voters in Oregon
might also have based their action in adopting this law upon the
(1998).
14. Quoted in GLENN, supra note 8, at 229.
15. Id. at 252.
16. Id.
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alarm which they felt at the rising tide of religious suspicions in this
country, and upon their belief that the basic cause of such religious
feelings was the separation of children along religious lines during
the most susceptible years of their lives, with the inevitable
awakening of a consciousness of separation, and a distrust and
suspicion of those from whom they were so carefully guarded. The
voters of Oregon might have felt that the mingling together, during
a portion of their education, of the children of all races and sects,
might be the best safeguard against future internal dissentions and
consequent weakening of the community against foreign dangers.17
No one can dismiss the force of this argument. Surely, the State
does have "an interest in making it certain that the citizen is fitted,
both in mind and body," to perform the duties of citizenship. Perhaps
it is true that a "basic cause" of the "rising tide of religious suspicions
in this country" is "the separation of children along religious lines
during the most susceptible years of their lives.""' Maybe the State of
Oregon was correct that "the mingling together, during a portion of
their education, of the children of all races and sects, might be the
best safeguard against future internal dissentions and consequent
weakening of the community."' 19
Who would guess that this argument was made on behalf of a
hateful law passed at the urging of the Ku Klux Klan for the purpose
of closing Catholic schools? 20 The irony of using social integration as
a means for destroying social pluralism was not lost on the Supreme
Court. The Court voted unanimously to strike down the law, saying
that "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. '21
II. ENFORCING CONFORMITY IN THE NAME OF PLURALISM
The modern emphasis on pluralism and diversity has rendered
the old "Americanization" project decidedly unattractive. But
establishmentarianism has had a rebirth-ironically, in the very name
of pluralism, diversity, and tolerance. Once again, powerful voices
argue that we need to inculcate public virtue. To be sure, the favored
17. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 524-25 (1925) (argument for the Governor of
Oregon).
18. Id. at 525.
19. Id.
20. See David B. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74
AMER. HIST. REV. 74 (1968).
21. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
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conception of the good life has changed. No longer do we emphasize
the Protestant, capitalist, and patriotic virtues of yesteryear. The new
ideology is based on the eradication of racism, sexism, heterosexism,
and related reactionary beliefs. The new virtue par excellence is the
virtue of toleration. Not only must we forswear the use of public
power or private violence to force our fellow citizens to conform to
our notions of the good life-we must affirm and respect their
choices. We must not be judgmental. We must be sensitive to their
feelings. We must be inclusive. The irony is that this new
establishmentarianism is just as hostile to pluralism, diversity, and
dissent as was the old. Let us consider several examples of the new
establishmentarianism.
Douglas Rader was a student at the University of Nebraska at
Kearney.2  He is a member of a religious minority. He believes that
the Bible is the Word of God, that he must live in a way that glorifies
God, and that there is no area of his life that is outside the influence
of his faith. He abstains from smoking, premarital sex, alcohol and
drugs, and profanity. On admission to the University, he asked to be
allowed to live in a supervised housing facility called the Christian
Student Fellowship. There he would be able to participate in regular
Bible study and fellowship and live in an environment supportive of
his chosen beliefs. The University, however, insisted that he live in a
freshman dormitory. According to the court, student life in the
dormitory was characterized by heavy drinking and drug use, casual
sexuality, and profanity. Rader testified that he had "heard from
many of my classmates and friends of the wild lifestyles allowed in the
dormitories at UNK.... The obnoxious alcohol parties in the
dormitories, the immoral atmosphere, and the intolerance towards
those who profess to be Christians" and stated that being required to
live in the dorm would "severely hinder" his free exercise of religion
and "be a definite hardship" for him. 23
The University exempted some 900 out of 2500 freshmen from
22. All of the following is taken from Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1543-49 (D.
Neb. 1996). There was a similar controversy at Yale University, involving Orthodox Jewish
students who objected to living in the loose moral environment of the dormitories. See Hack v.
President & Fellows of Yale College, 16 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Conn. 1998) (appeal pending); John
Garvey, The Yale Five, COMMONWEAL, July 17, 1998, at 7. I focus on the Rader case because it
involved a public university. As a private university, Yale has every right to be illiberal, and its
only real offense was its hypocrisy in claiming to encourage pluralism and diversity while
refusing to accommodate the needs of members of an obvious moral-religious minority.
23. See Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1544-45. This may be compared to the idea of a "hostile
environment" under modem sexual harassment law.
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the dormitory requirement for various reasons, but refused to exempt
students who wished to live at the Christian Student Fellowship.
There was reason to believe this was because University officials
viewed Rader's conservative moral and religious beliefs as narrow-
minded. Referring to Rader and his family and friends, a University
official testified: "I would differ with those in the room. Diversity of
thought is positive." 24 The University defended its requirement, as
applied to Rader, on the ground that living in a dormitory would
"foster diversity and promote tolerance among UNK students." 2
That apparently meant that Rader was insufficiently tolerant and
open to diversity, since University officials seemed unmoved by
Rader's complaint that life in the dorms was intolerant toward his
way of life and overwhelmingly nondiverse from his point of view. In
support of its policy, the University introduced a statistical study
entitled How College Affects Students, which reported that on-campus
residency is "positively, if modestly linked to... a liberalizing of
social, political, and religious values and attitudes," and makes it
more likely that the resident "will exhibit no religious preference by
the time he or she is a senior in college. '26 Apparently, the University
viewed abandonment of moral and religious upbringing as a
liberating and enlightening development in the lives of students.
The irony here was essentially the same as in Pierce. It should be
obvious that Rader, with his old-fashioned morality, was the dissenter
in this environment. The residence requirement was a means by
which to pressure him, and students like him, to conform to the
dominant moral-political orthodoxy-just as the requirement of
attendance at Protestant-dominated public schools in Pierce was a
means by which to convert members of the Catholic minority to
majoritarian conceptions of "Americanism." Rader made moral
judgments that ran contrary to the University's idea of "diversity,"
which means boundless tolerance for everything -except for dissent
from the dogma of toleration. To require members of a minority to
avoid "exclusive" subgroups (such as the Christian Student
Fellowship in Rader) is to favor majoritarianism. Unless minority
groups can form separate communities, they will be swamped.
The University's policy in the Rader case is an illustration of the
confusion of genuine liberalism, which is political, with a particular
24. Id. at 1554 n.26.
25. Id. at 1543.
26. Id. at 1549 n.17.
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understanding of virtue. Rawls has explained that a "political"
conception of justice is one that applies only to "the framework of
basic institutions," whereas a "comprehensive" doctrine is one that
addresses nonpolitical life as well, including "conceptions of what is
of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as
ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships,
and much else that is to inform our conduct." 2 Political liberalism
insists that the state must be tolerant-better yet, neutral-among
reasonable conceptions of the good. That does not mean that
individuals must be neutral among conceptions of the good. Indeed,
to insist that individuals be neutral is illiberal, because it favors one
controversial understanding of the good life over others. Douglas
Rader is a citizen, too, and his understanding of the good life deserves
respect no less than that of his more latitudinarian peers. To insist
that citizens of a liberal regime display the moral qualities that a
liberal state must display is Platonic and establishmentarian, not
liberal.
A second recent episode involves the exclusion of the Christian
Legal Society from the services of the placement office at two
prominent law schools (Yale and Chicago). These schools prohibit
the use of placement services by employers that discriminate on a
number of grounds, including religion. Because Christian Legal
Society does not hire staff members or student interns who do not
share the organization's religious beliefs, it has been banned from
recruiting on the campus of these schools, along with racists and other
discriminators.
But it is not right to apply a religious nondiscrimination
requirement to a religious organization, any more than it would be
appropriate to forbid other ideologically based organizations to hire
on the basis of adherence to their ideology. It would be silly (or
worse) to forbid synagogues from "discriminating" in favor of Jews
when they hire rabbis, or to prevent Catholic archdioceses from
hiring only Catholic canon lawyers. The same is true of Christian
Legal Society staffers. The responsibilities of staff lawyers include
leadership of Bible studies and worship activities for student and
lawyer groups, providing guidance for lawyers about their ethical
responsibilities as Christian lawyers, and helping to develop policies
and positions on matters of concern to the Christian legal community.
These are legitimate -indeed praiseworthy- activities, and they
27. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 11-13.
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cannot be conducted by a person outside the faith. The religious
employment criterion does not discriminate "against" non-Christians;
religion is a bona fide occupational qualification for these positions.
For precisely this reason, federal civil rights laws exempt
religious organizations from the religious antidiscrimination laws.
This exemption was unanimously upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos.38 In his
concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan explained that
"religious organizations have an interest in autonomy in ordering
their internal affairs, so that they may be free to: 'select their own
leaders, define their own doctrines, resolve their own disputes, and
run their own institutions."'' 9 Brennan continued: "we deem it vital
that, if certain activities constitute part of a religious community's
practice, then a religious organization should be able to require that
only members of its community perform those activities." 3 To be
sure, as private institutions, Yale and Chicago have the right to adopt
policies that differ from federal antidiscrimination law, and are under
no obligation to act in conformity to the First Amendment, but I
cannot fathom why they should choose to do so.
This is an example of intolerance masquerading as
nondiscrimination. No other ideologically oriented organization is
required to hire people who do not share the organization's
philosophy. The Sierra Club is free to hire environmentalists and to
reject applicants who think pollution is a good thing. Lambda Legal
Defense Fund is free to hire believers in gay rights and to reject those
they consider homophobes. Only religious organizations are denied
the freedom to exclude those who do not share their beliefs. The
effect is not to expand opportunities or combat prejudice, but simply
to reduce the diversity of job opportunities that law students will
learn about from the placement center, and to stigmatize legitimate
groups as unworthy "discriminators."
A third example involves the Boy Scouts. In a recent decision,31
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Boy Scout troops, though a
private expressive organization, may not discriminate on the basis of
28. 483 U.S. 327, 328 (1987).
29. Id. at 341 (quoting Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1373, 1389 (1981)).
30. Id. at 342-43.
31. All of the following is taken from Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 734 A.2d 1196, 1229-
30 (1999), cert. granted, no. 99-699. The author of this essay is assisting the Boy Scouts in this
case in the United States Supreme Court.
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(among other characteristics) religion, sex, or sexual orientation in
their selection of members or leaders. The court held that it must
allow James Dale, an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist, to
serve as assistant scoutmaster, despite the Boy Scouts' view that
homosexual conduct violates the Scout Oath and Law. The logic of
the decision suggests that Boy Scout troops could similarly be
required to appoint atheists as scoutmasters, notwithstanding the
requirement of reverence toward God. The court stated-
implausibly-that this would not affect the Boy Scouts' ability to
communicate their moral views. The court disregarded the fact that
the scoutmaster, as leader, is responsible for communicating the
organization's message to the members. No expressive association
can survive if the government can insist that it appoint leaders whose
words and conduct are contrary to the group's moral or philosophical
position.
Some have greeted this decision as a victory for the civil rights of
homosexuals. But it is not that. No person has a civil right to join or
lead an organization when they do not share its beliefs. No matter
how strongly the legislature of New Jersey may feel about the
morality of homosexual conduct, it should not be able to impose
those opinions on private organizations with a contrary view.
As these examples illustrate, the modern insistence on
"diversity" can collide with freedom of association, and threaten to
undermine the diversity and pluralism of the society as a whole. If
every group is internally diverse and pluralistic, reflecting the
population as a whole, every group will be the same. If groups are
required to accept members and appoint leaders who do not share
their distinctive beliefs, their distinctive voice will be silenced. If
individuals with disfavored beliefs can be forced to participate in
institutions designed to mold them in accordance with the dictates of
political correctness, the tapestry of pluralism will be seriously
impaired. Genuine pluralism requires group difference, and
maintenance of group difference requires that groups have the
freedom to exclude, as well as the freedom to dissent. Freedom of
association is an essential structural principle in a liberal society.
III. STEPHEN MACEDO'S SUBTLER, GENTLER
ESTABLISHMENTARIANISM
In his contribution to this symposium, to which I have been
asked to respond, Stephen Macedo provides a surprisingly frank
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defense of the new establishmentarianism. In marked contrast to
those who see deep diversity and pluralism as characteristic of
modem liberal society, Macedo is confident that "[t]his society stands
for certain common values. '3 In his essay, Macedo is a bit vague
about the content of these values; they apparently center on
inclusiveness and cooperation. 33 More significantly, these values,
while "common," are also disputed and endangered. (One guesses
that if he were more specific about the content of these values, they
would be even more disputed and controversial than he lets on.) 34 In
order to protect these "common"-but disputed and endangered-
values, we need to "think about the ways in which our institutions
either support, or do not support, the habits, attitudes, and character
traits needed by freely self-governing citizens." 35 We need to realize
that the existence and autonomy of private associations is
problematic: to the extent that private associations are consistent with
a "strategy for pursuing public purposes more effectively," 36 they
should be encouraged; but to the extent they dissent from "our largest
and most inclusive civic ideals," 37 they should be discouraged.
Specifically, we should insist that groups "be arranged in
pluralistic patterns, ' 38 meaning that they foster a mixing of races,
sexes, and beliefs; "the crucial thing is to foster memberships that are
32. Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Voucher, Religious Nonprofit
Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 417 (2000). The Macedo essay
was revised after preparation of this response. With Macedo's permission, I have retained some
quotations from the original essay that do no appear in the published version. The revised essay
makes more modest claims about the need for public orthodoxy-though his ultimate
conclusions remain the same. For example, Macedo has abandoned his claim, quoted in text,
that "[t]his society stands for certain common values." He has substituted the more ambiguous
claim that "[e]ven a free, individualistic society is-to a greater degree than is often allowed-a
particular type of society as a whole, having its own distinctive patterns and overarching values."
Id. at 420. He goes on to say that citizens of this country have an obligation to "support
democratic institutions" and to "respect the rights of other citizens." Id. Nothing in this more
modest formulation of his position suggests any reason why liberal citizens should be
discouraged from joining together in non-universalistic groups based on common interests and
commitments.
33. "Our civic aim is to foster cooperativeness and reciprocity not only within particular
groups but across groups." Id. at 429.
34. In another work, Macedo states that his brand of liberalism is "deeply at odds with
certain religious faiths (from Augustinian Catholicism to Islamic fundamentalism) and many
other ways of life." STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 74 (1990). Adherents to these
"many" ways of life will no doubt find Macedo's claim to speak for our common values
presumptuous, if not frightening.
35. Macedo, supra note 32, at 421.
36. This statement quoted in text comes from the original version of Macedo's essay.
37. Macedo, supra note 32, at 428.
38. This statement quoted in text comes from the original version of Macedo's essay.
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not tribalistic but pluralistic."3 9 He thinks it is important to weaken
people's ties to specific groups, so that "no one affiliation or set of
affiliations" will be seen to provide an "unproblematic" answer to the
question "'who I am." '40 "Intensely inward-looking and insular group
allegiances" are "at odds with the openness of liberal citizenship at its
best."41
To be sure, Macedo recognizes that there is something illiberal in
the notion that institutions that dissent from the society's collective
conception of public virtue should be suppressed. He does not mean
to "provide a justification for coercive intervention or for limiting
freedom of association." 42 "All liberals," he assures us, "will join in
opposing the coercive pursuit of a very demanding ideal of good
citizenship."'43 But, he reminds us, "the instruments of public policy
are often subtle" and it is hard to see why we must abstain from
gently promoting patterns of good citizenship." Liberalism does not
"reject the noncoercive promotion of civic virtue. '45
Macedo thus proposes what might be called a "subtler, gentler"
establishmentarianism. This approach converts liberalism from a
position in which freedom of association, with its attendant pluralism
and diversity, is seen as desirable, to the view that the government's
means by which to suppress differences should be restricted.
Contrary to what is usually thought, liberal states may espouse an
orthodoxy about the good life. So long as they do not engage in
outright "coercion," they may use "subtle" and "gentle" instruments
of government power-including taxation and selective funding-to
promote their view of patterns of good citizenship.
Any liberal tempted to endorse Macedo's noncoercive
establishmentarianism in anticipation of its effects on distasteful
private groups should be warned: there is no guarantee that
government will share Macedo's particular understanding of public
virtue. The instruments of government power (however "subtle" and
"gentle") will be wielded as a result of political decisions, for better or
worse. Rudolph Giuliani will wield the powers of the public fisc as
often as Hillary Clinton. The only guarantee is that majoritarian
39. Macedo, supra note 32, at 428.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 429.
42. Id. at 424.
43. This statement quoted in text comes from the original version of Macedo's essay.
44. Macedo, supra note 32, at 424.
45. Id.
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norms will tend to be favored over minority voices. That is one
reason liberals have traditionally resisted this idea.
As a theory of constitutional law, there is something to commend
Macedo's view that government may use its control over public
resources to encourage some beliefs and discourage others (though it
is not ordinarily associated with people who call themselves
"liberals"). The government may not punish artists for producing
indecent or blasphemous art, but it may deny them subsidies. The
government may not force students to participate in the pledge of
allegiance, but it is not unconstitutional to lead the class in the pledge.
The government may not be able to declare Christianity the national
religion, but it can declare Christmas a national holiday. The
government may not prevent women from aborting their unborn
children, but it doesn't have to pay for abortions, or allow
government-funded doctors to counsel or refer for abortions. In legal
jargon, this is called the "right-privilege distinction," which is opposed
to the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions." Because the
unintended and incidental effects of government programs are so
widespread, and inquiries into motive so indeterminate, it is difficult
to craft judicially manageable standards in cases not involving either
coercion or viewpoint discrimination. (The indeterminacy of the
"endorsement" standard for Establishment Clause cases is ample
evidence of that.)4 But constitutional law should not be confused
with liberal political theory. Macedo seems to argue not merely that
there is no judicially enforceable prohibition on the use of "subtler,
gentler" (i.e., noncoercive) governmental power to favor some
understandings of good citizenship over others, but that this is
desirable. I consider that highly questionable -at least as a matter of
liberal theory.
Even as a matter of constitutional law, the Court has not drawn a
clear line between coercion and other uses of governmental power.
Indeed, the contours of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine are a
notoriously murky and contested area of law.47 Much depends on the
46. See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 267 (1987).
47. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term: Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Seth F.
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA.
L. REv. 1293 (1984); Michael McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and
Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REv. 989, 1049 (1991); Michael McConnell, Unconstitutional
Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
255, 257 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 989, 990 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
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breadth of the beneficiary class, the objectivity or subjectivity of
governmental allocation criteria, and established patterns of
governance. Most to the point, it seems relatively clear that
governments may not grant or withhold public benefits on the basis of
viewpoint, and that religion is a viewpoint. 48 To the extent that
Macedo wishes to use the power of selective funding to discriminate
against groups that do not share his particular brand of "good
citizenship," and especially those that impart a religious ideology, it
seems likely that he will run afoul of the First Amendment. Less
direct forms of interference with the operations of private groups will
raise more difficult legal issues.
Macedo supports his position by analogy to the Founders'
preference for an extended Union, which by encompassing many
diverse interests and factions would foster deliberation and diminish
the risk of factional oppression. With all respect, that is a false
analogy. Of course, a liberal society may (and should) structure
governmental institutions in an inclusive manner. It is an entirely
different proposition that liberal society should use its authority to
attempt to induce private associations to conform to those same
norms.
Macedo's specific example of how his approach would work-
educational vouchers that would include religious schools-is
illuminating. Vouchers, he argues, could be an effective way to
induce private sectarian schools to "become more religiously
pluralistic. ' 49  He points to features of the voucher plans in
Milwaukee and Cleveland that require participating schools to admit
voucher students on a random basis and to excuse voucher students
from compulsory religious exercises. When schools admit students of
different faiths, he points out, this will generate "pressures to create a
welcoming and nondiscriminatory atmosphere."0 He foresees
"problems for the religious schools if enrolled voucher children feel
that they are being pressured to either conform with religious beliefs
and practices or leave the school. ' 51 He predicts that, as a result of
vouchers, the school's "affiliation with the particular sponsoring
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an Anacronism (With Particular Reference to Religion,
Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REv. 593 (1990); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
48. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 820-21 (1995).
49. This statement quoted in text comes from the original version of Macedo's essay.
50. Macedo, supra note 32, at 437.
51. Id.
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religious community" is "very likely to be somewhat muted, even
attenuated, or at least revised as a consequence. '52 In other words,
private religious schools would be forced by the internal pressure of a
diverse student body to soften, and perhaps abandon, their religious
identity and message. Under vouchers, he says, the schools "must
become a bit more like public-or as they were once called
'common'-schools. 53
But why would it be a good thing to induce religious schools to
shed their religiosity? Macedo does not say. Nothing in his essay
suggests a conscious anti-religious animus, and his qualified support
for educational vouchers is at least superficially pluralistic. But
Macedo equates secularization of private schools with their becoming
"more attuned to public values. 5 4 This is difficult to understand. So
long as schools provide high quality education to low income
children, and teach their own brand of democratic patriotism, why are
"public values" offended by religious "sectarianism?''5 5 One would
expect a religiously neutral government to be neutral-not opposed-
to sectarian instruction.
It cannot be thought that eliminating or reducing religious
alternatives is an advance for individual freedom. To be sure, some
families might like to have the choice to obtain the secular benefits of
education at a particular school without being troubled by its religious
message. But this would deprive other families of what would seem
to be an equally valuable freedom: to choose a school for both its
secular and its religious benefits. It is logically possible to please both
types of family by creating a pluralistic system in which some schools
are religious and some are not. Each family could exercise choice at
the front end, but no one should be given a "heckler's veto" over the
educational philosophy or program at the school they have chosen.
Macedo's plan, which results in "muting, or attenuating, or at least
revising" the religious identity of all schools (at the price of losing an
entitlement to a fair share of public benefits), seems to reduce the
level of freedom overall.
Macedo endorses a provision of the Wisconsin voucher
legislation that forces participating schools to permit voucher
recipients to "opt out of any religious activity that they or their
52. Id.
53. Id. at 437.
54. Id. at 436.
55. See id. at 437.
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parents find objectionable. 5 6 Interestingly, children attending public
schools have no such right to opt out of activities (such as parts of the
school program, tendentious and unbalanced textbooks, lewd sex
education assemblies or free condom distribution programs) that
parents find religiously objectionable. 57 It is hard to understand why
private institutions, chosen by the families, should have a greater
obligation to accommodate dissenters than public schools where
pupils are assigned by the government. When families choose among
educational options, the freedom to "opt out" of unwelcome parts of
the educational program can and should be exercised at the
beginning, when choosing the school. Nothing in civil libertarian
principle supports the proposition that they should be able to force
the school, which presumably reflects the preferences of other
families, to change its practices.
Nor is it necessary for a private school, even if it receives voucher
students, to accept students who do not share its religious
commitment. It is not invidiously discriminatory for a private
association committed to certain beliefs and values to limit itself to
persons who share those beliefs and values. Indeed, this is essential
for the broader pluralism of society. Thus, when passing the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, when Congress forbade recipients of federal
financial assistance to discriminate on the basis of race, it explicitly
chose not to impose a similar prohibition on discrimination on the
basis of religion. Indeed, to impose such a restriction, when secular
associations are generally free to "discriminate" on the basis of
adherence to their value systems, might well be unconstitutional.
Although Macedo apparently does not take this view, the most
logical reason to suppose that a decline in the religiosity of education
would be a good thing is that religion-or at least religious
difference-is a bad thing. Perhaps religion provides too strong an
affiliation. Believers may get the impression that allegiance to the
Supreme Being is a superior obligation to the obligations of a citizen.
Perhaps religious difference is an obstacle to what Rousseau called
"fraternity" and Macedo calls "cooperativeness and reciprocity.
.across groups."5 As the attorney for the State of Oregon argued in
Pierce, the "rising tide of religious suspicions in this country" may be
56. Id. at 439.
57. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Sch. Bd., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 531-32
(1st Cir. 1995); Curtis v. School Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580, 585 (Mass. 1995).
58. Macedo, supra note 32, at 429.
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attributable to "the separation of children along religious lines during
the most susceptible years of their lives, with the inevitable
awakening of a consciousness of separation.59 It is better to mold the
youth of America according to "common" ideals and "common
values," which must be secular in nature.
This view of religion, however, is utterly without empirical
support. There is not a scrap of evidence that religiosity is correlated
with bad citizenship, intolerance, or lack of cooperativeness. Indeed,
by most objective measures, religious Americans are more
democratically engaged than most of their fellow citizens.6 Church
attendance has a high correlation to voter turnout-far higher than
any other institutional affiliation. 61 Religion also seems to encourage
other forms of civic engagement. Students at nonpublic schools are
far more likely to engage in community service than students at
public schools. Only 9.7% of public school students report work on
community service, as compared to 22.3% of students in Catholic
schools and 31.2% of students in other private schools. 62 By far the
most common form of voluntary charitable activity in America is
under religious auspices.6 3 Religiosity also tends to correlate with
socially responsible behavior, such as lower drug use, crime, cheating,
and adolescent sex.6
This not particularly surprising. Precisely because they reflect a
more homogeneous moral community, religious schools are able to
inculcate public virtue more effectively than public schools. Religious
schools can teach from a coherent moral framework, and can use the
potent cultural resources of the religious tradition. Public schools, by
contrast, must be reluctant to offend. The very features Macedo
59. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 525 (1925).
60. For more detail on this point, see Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment:
Why Democratic Values Are Ill-Served By Democratic Control of Education, in NOMOS XLIII:
MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., forthcoming 2000).
61. See SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: Civic VOLUNTARISM IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 359 (1995). In this context, I use the term "church" to denote any
religious worship service or religious organization.
62. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1997, at table 146
(1997).
63. See JOHN A. COLEMAN, Deprivatizing Religion and Revitalizing Citizenship, in
RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 264 (Paul Weithman ed., 1997); VERBA ET AL.,
supra note 61, at 297.
64. See DAVID B. LARSON & SUSAN S. LARSON, THE FORGOTTEN FACTOR IN PHYSICAL
AND MENTAL HEALTH: WHAT DOES THE RESEARCH SHOW? 65-78 (1994); J. Gartner et al.,
Religious Commitment and Mental Health: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 19 J. PSYCHOL.
& THEOLOGY 6 (1991); Norval D. Glenn & Charles N. Weaver, A Multivariate, Multisurvey
Study of Marital Happiness, 40 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 269, 279 (1978); Barbara R. Lorch &
Robert H. Hughes, Religion and Youth Substance Abuse, 24 J. RELIG. & HEALTH 197 (1985).
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hopes will be destroyed by vouchers are what give private schools
their comparative advantage as moral educators. The premise of the
argument for vouchers is that they will lead to greater diversity and
competition among schools. If the policy has the effect of subjecting
all schools-even private schools-to the homogenizing effects of
government regulation, and thus to make them more like public
schools, the experiment will be self-defeating.
Macedo may have no special animus against religion as such. His
concern seems to be that some groups inspire too intense a loyalty.
He worries when "one affiliation or set of affiliations provides an
unproblematic or simple answer to the question 'who am I?' ' He
prefers "fragmented loyalties" and "moderated commitments." 66 He
thinks the state should encourage "pluralistic" groups-meaning
groups that lack any strong sense of common identity based on
nonuniversalistic characteristics- and should discourage "tribalism,"
which he does not define. 7 This, however, seems dubious as a matter
of social psychology. Groups do not typically form around
universalistic characteristics; what would be the point? Groups are
defined by their particular interests, backgrounds, beliefs, and
aspirations. The hope is that through these more particularistic
associations, individuals become attached to wider circles of
community. As Burke famously argued: "To be attached to the
subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the
first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first
link in the series by which we proceed toward a love to our country
and to mankind."68  To discourage the "little platoons" on the
assumption that they are too "tribalistic" is self-defeating. Pluralism
is a product not of many pluralistic groups, but of many different
groups.
Macedo argues that advocates of civil society, such as myself,
make inconsistent claims. On the one hand, we contend that
"America has always been characterized by too much pluralism, too
much religious and cultural diversity, for a system of common
65. Macedo, supra note 32, at 428.
66. Id. at 429.
67. Id. at 428. Even on these criteria, we should not worry too much about religion in the
United States today. In a country riven by racial and social divisions, churches often serve as
cross-cutting associations. For many people, church is the place they most often cross paths, as
equals, with people from other races and walks of life. It takes a strong bond-such as faith in
Christ-to break down other barriers.
68. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, 41 (J. G. A.
Pocock ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1987) (1790).
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schooling to be possible." 69 On the other hand, we contend that
"school choice that includes religious schooling would serve public
values more effectively than today's public schools. '70 He sees this as
a contradiction: "Which is it? Should we adopt a policy of educational
choice because we have no common values, no civic ideals? Or
because a greater degree of choice would better serve public values
properly understood?" '71
This is not a contradiction. What Macedo fails to appreciate is
that virtue - public or otherwise - cannot be orchestrated by the state.
It is the product of voluntary communities, teaching and learning
through conviction, not force. The United States of America does
have certain common values, but these values are rooted in quite
different traditions and systems of beliefs, and are understood in
many different ways. To attempt to define those values is a mistake,
because any authoritative definition necessarily will be too limited
and too parochial. The great promise of civil society is that it
provides a means for inculcation of public virtue without direct
imposition of a public orthodoxy.
This has been America's experience with disestablishmenta-
rianism. America's founders appreciated that republican government
would require public virtue, and that public virtue requires the
underpinnings of religion and morality. But they also realized that
America was too diverse to permit agreement on religious
fundamentals and, thus, that an attempt to establish an official church
would produce division and discord. The great solution to the
republican problem was to promote public virtue indirectly, by
protecting freedom of speech, association, and religion, and leaving
the nation's communities of belief free to inculcate their ideas of the
good life, each in their own way. To attempt to direct and control this
process-to establish a new public orthodoxy through the
noncoercive powers of government-will not succeed, because it
cannot. In a pluralistic society, such as ours, common values are not
determined by central authorities, but emerge from the overlapping
consensus of free private associations. Establishmentarianism is
neither liberal in theory nor successful in practice.
69. Macedo, supra note at 32, at 450.
70. Id. at 451.
71. Id.
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